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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether a case may be dismissed for failure to appoint a personal representative, 
notwithstanding statutory language under Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803(4)(b) allowing an 
injured person to bring a case after the death of a tortfeasor against either the deceased, or 
a personal representative. 
Standard of Review: When reviewing a judgment entered on Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the appellate court is obliged to 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all 
reasonable inferences in his favor. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, the 
appellate court gives the trial court no deference and reviews it under a correctness 
standard. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co.. 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996); Russell 
v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Wright v. University of Utah. 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct 
App. 1994). 
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This issue was raised in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss (R. 52-63). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his 
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a 
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all 
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by 
the procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. After distribution a creditor whose 
claim has not been barred may recover from the distributees as provided in 
Section 75-3-1004 or from a former personal representative individually liable 
as provided in Section 75-3-1005. This section has no application to a 
proceeding by a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce his right to his 
security except as to any deficiency judgment which might be sought therein. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-104. 
(1) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or 
appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will 
previously probated at the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings 
relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be 
commenced more than three yfears after the decedent's death, except: 
(a) If a previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt about the fact 
of the decedent's death, appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy 
proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a finding that 
the decedent's death occurred prior to the initiation of the previous 
proceeding and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed unduly in 
initiating the subsequent proceeding. 
(b) Appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be 
maintained in relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared, or missing 
person for whose estate a conservator has been appointed, at any time 
within three years after the conservator becomes able to establish the death 
of the protected person. 
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c) A proceeding to contest an informally probated will and to secure 
appointment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the event 
the contest is successful, may be commenced within the later of twelve 
months from the informal probate or three years from the decedent's death. 
(2) The limitations provided in Subsection (1) do not apply to proceedings 
to construe probated wills or determine heirs of an intestate. In cases under 
Subsection (l)(a) or (b), the date on which a testacy or appointment 
proceeding is properly commenced shall be deemed to be the date of the 
decedent's death for purposes of other limitations provisions of this title 
which relate to the date of death. 
(3) If no will is probated within three years from death, the presumption of 
intestacy is final and the court shall enter an order to that effect and provide 
for the distribution of the decedent's property in accordance with the laws of 
intestacy under Title 75, Chapter 2, Part 1, The court has continuing 
jurisdiction to handle all matters necessary to distribute the decedent's 
property, including jurisdiction to determine what property was owned by 
the decedent at the time of death. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-107. 
Unless an estate is insolvent the personal representative, with the consent of 
all successors whose interests would be affected, may waive any defense of 
limitations available to the estate. If the defense is not waived, no claim 
which was barred by any statute of limitations at the time of the decedent's 
death shall be allowed or paid. The running of any statute of limitations 
measured from some other event than death and advertisement for claims 
against a decedent is suspended during the three months following the 
decedent's death but resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to 
the sections which follow. For purposes of any statute of limitations, the 
proper presentation of a claim under Section 75-3-804 is equivalent to 
commencement of a proceeding on the claim. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-802. 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether due 
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or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded 
on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of 
limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the 
heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier of the 
following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors who are 
given actual notice, and where notice is published, within the time provided in 
Subsection 75-3-801 (1) for all claims barred by publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's 
domicile are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due 
or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded 
on contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as 
follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative within three 
months after performance by the personal representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or the time 
specified in Subsection (l)(a). 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon 
property of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish 
liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected 
by liability insurance; or 
c) collection of compensation for services rendered and reimbursement for 
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expenses advanced by the personal representative or by the attorney or 
accountant for the personal representative of the estate. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803. 
(1) (a) A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another, does not abate upon the 
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of action 
against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for 
special and general damages, subject to Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If, prior to judgment or settlement, the injured person dies as a result of a 
cause other than the injury received as a result of the wrongful act or 
negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of the 
person have a cause of action against the wrongdoer or personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer for special damages, and general damages 
not to exceed $100,000, which resulted from the injury caused by the 
wrongdoer and which occurred prior to death of the injured party from the 
unrelated cause. 
c) If the death of the injured party from an unrelated cause occurs more than 
six months after the incident giving rise to the claim for damages, the claim 
shall be limited to special damages unless, prior to the expiration of the six 
months, written notice of intent to hold the wrongdoer responsible has been 
given or is the subject of ongoing negotiations between the parties or persons 
representing the parties or their insurers. 
Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who dies may recover judgment except 
upon competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of the injured 
person. 
(3) This section may not be construed to be retroactive. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-107. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an automobile collision involving Plaintiff William Berneau 
and Cameron Martino. Plaintiff timely filed suit prior to four years following the 
collision pursuant to the four year statute of limitations found at Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
2-307(3). Plaintiff thereafter refiled his Complaint pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-
111 after the Complaint had been dismissed without prejudice for failure to timely serve, 
and thereafter effected service of the Summons and Complaint. Defendant thereafter 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing Plaintiff failed to appoint a personal 
representative within the three year time period found at Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107. 
The trial court agreed and entered its Order Granting Motion to Dismiss on February 17, 
2009, from which Plaintiff now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to dismiss, the 
appellate court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). 
1. On or about September 23, 2003, Cameron Martino negligently caused an 
automobile collision with Plaintiff proximately causing William Berneau to suffer 
personal injuries. (R. 2.) 
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2. At the time of the auto collision, Mr. Martino was insured by State Farm 
Insurance ("State Farm"). (R.11.) 
3. Mr. Martino, due to causes unrelated to the auto collision, passed away 
December 3, 2003, at the age of 22. (R.10). 
4. No probate was filed, and no notice was given to Mr. Berneau of Mr. 
Martino's death, either actual or constructive. (R.11.) 
5. On April 29, 2004, Plaintiff through his counsel sent a letter to State Farm 
indicating Plaintiffs intention to bring a claim for personal injuries arising out of the auto 
collision involving their insured Mr. Martino, and advising of representation by counsel 
of Plaintiff (R.21.) 
6. From this point forward, Plaintiffs attorney and State Farm had an ongoing 
dialogue, both written and verbal, concerning Plaintiffs claim. (R.53.) 
7. Plaintiffs treatment following the collision with Defendant has been 
complicated and ongoing, and Plaintiff remains uncertain whether he will require surgery 
to correct the injuries he sustained in the collision with Defendant. (R.59.) 
8. Plaintiff timely filed his original Complaint in this matter on September 14, 
2007, but did not serve the Complaint due to the ongoing nature of Plaintiff s treatment 
for his injuries sustained in the collision. (R.10.) 
9. State Farm did not learn of the death of its insured until October 4, 2007, 
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more than four years after the date of the collision with Plaintiff. (R.35.) 
10. On February 4, 200 8, Plaintiffs received a letter from State Farm indicating 
their insured Cameron Martino had died in 2003. (R.53.) 
11. After Plaintiff received notification of Defendant's death by State Farm, 
Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure to serve on February 275 
2008; Plaintiff timely refiled his Complaint on August 1, 2008 pursuant to the savings 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111. (R.53.) 
12. As Plaintiff was not certain whether a personal representative had been 
appointed for the estate of Defendant, Plaintiff filed suit against both the Defendant and 
his estate, explicitly seeking recovery strictly up to the limits of the insurance proceeds 
held by decedent by invoking Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)(b). (R.54.) 
13. Plaintiffs Complaint was served upon State Farm after the trial court 
granted Plaintiffs Motion to Allow for Alternative Service of Process, which motion was 
filed because Plaintiff was unaware of the appointment of any personal representative and 
Plaintiff was only seeking recovery on the decedent's insurance proceeds pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)(b). (R.27-29.) 
14. State Farm, through its staff counsel and on behalf of Defendant, 
subsequently filed a responsive pleading in the form of a Motion to Dismiss, arguing 
Plaintiffs claim was time barred for failing to appoint a personal representative within 
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three years pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107. (R. 30-51.) 
15. State Farm did not object to service in its responsive pleading, and service 
therefore was valid in the underlying action. (R. 30-51.) See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h); 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1976). 
16. The trial court granted Defendant's Motion, reasoning that Plaintiff had 
failed to appoint a personal representative within three years, and entered its Order 
Granting Motion to Dismiss on February 17, 2009, from which Plaintiff now appeals. (R. 
102-110, 118-120.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A case cannot properly be dismissed for failure to timely appoint a personal 
representative where the Plaintiffs Complaint seeks recovery exclusively under Utah 
Code Ann. §75-3-803(4)(b), which allows an injured plaintiff to recover up to the limits 
of a deceased tortfeasor's insurance protection in uany proceeding to establish liability of 
the decedent or the personal representative." Id, (emphasis added). 
Simply stated, Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803(4)(b) allows for claims to be against a 
decedent or the personal representative of the decedent's estate. Therefore, there is no 
requirement for a plaintiff, when a plaintiff is making no claim against a decedent's 
estate, to appoint a personal representative of the decedent's estate. Under Utah Code 
Aim. §75-3-803(4)(b), the plaintiff may simply bring the claim against the decedent. 
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ARGUMENT 
The sole issue before this Court is whether a case may be dismissed for failure to 
appoint a personal representative, notwithstanding statutory language allowing an injured 
person to bring a case after the death of a tortfeasor against either the deceased, or a 
personal representative. 
The controlling statute at issue is found at Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803, which 
states in relevant part: 
Limitations on presentation of claims. 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether 
due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, 
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other 
statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented 
within the earlier of the following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors who 
are given actual notice, and where notice is published, within the time 
provided in Subsection 75-3-801 (1) for all claims barred by publication. 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to 
establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which 
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he is protected by liability insurance; . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). This Court has repeatedly held when interpreting statutory 
language the Court will "look first to the statute's plain language to determine its 
meaning." H.U.F. v. W.P.W.. 2009 UT 10,1J32, 203 P.3d 943. When determining the 
meaning of a statute's plain language, the court is to "presume that the statute is valid and 
the words and phrases were chosen carefully and advisedly." Salt Lake Bd. of 
Equalization v. Tax Comm'n.. 2004 UT App 472, [^15, 106 P.3d 185 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
According to the plain language of this statute, all claims which arise before the 
death of a defendant tortfeasor not otherwise barred by earlier statutes of limitations are 
barred as against the estate and heirs unless brought within one year or less where notice 
is given to creditors under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-801. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
803(1). 
However, under subsection (4), the plain language of this same statute further 
states these deadlines do not apply "to the limits of the insurance protection only, any 
proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which 
he is protected by liability insurance." Id at -803(4)(b). Accordingly, notwithstanding 
the time limits of the probate code to present claims, an injured plaintiff may still bring a 
claim against "the decedent or the personal representative" for the insurance proceeds. 
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As it is presumed "words and phrases were chosen carefully and advisedly" in the 
statute, Salt Lake Bd. of Equalization v. Tax Comm'n., 2004 UT App 472,^15, the word 
"or" between "the decedent" and "the personal representative" means the legislature has 
specifically provided proceedings against a decedent can proceed to establish the 
decedent's liability "to the limits of the insurance protection." Under the plain language 
of the statute, Plaintiff need not proceed against the personal representative of the estate 
of the decedent, and Plaintiff respectfully submits to hold otherwise requires ignoring the 
plain language of the statute allowing proceedings against either "the decedent," or "the 
personal representative." 
Finally, as to the language in section 803 allowing a claim "not barred earlier by 
other statute of limitations," section 75-3-802, "Statutes of limitations," establishes that 
the usual statutes of limitations for claims which had not expired at the time of the 
decedent's death control: "The running of any statute of limitations measured from some 
other event than death and advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspended 
during the three months following the decedeut's death but resumes thereafter as to 
claims not barred pursuant to the sections which follow." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-802. 
As stated above, Plaintiffs claim is for personal injuries arising out of an automobile 
collision, and not the Defendant's death. Plaintiffs claim is therefore controlled by the 
\? 
four year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307(3), and suit was 
timely filed within four years. (R. 10.) 
The plain language of section 803 notwithstanding, Defendant argued to the trial 
court below that a personal representative was nevertheless required. (R. 34-35.) The trial 
court agreed. In support of this holding the trial court stated: "Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
104 prohibits a claim against a decedent or his successors until a personal representative 
can be appointed. In this instant [sic], it is undisputed no probate or other proceeding to 
appoint a personal representative has ever been presented." (R. 106.) (emphasis added). 
The trial court then cited to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107, which generally provides a three 
year time limit to appoint a personal representative. Id Finding this time limit had not 
been met to appoint a personal representative, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs case. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the above emphasized language of the trial court's 
only reasoning for its decision demonstrates the error in the trial court's holding. Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-104 does not require a personal representative be appointed in claims 
being made against a decedent; rather, it applies only in claims being made against the 
estate: "No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his 
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal 
representative." Id (emphasis added). 
Unlike section 803 of the Probate Code, section 104 does not apply to "any 
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proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative/' Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-803; instead section 104 by its plain language only applies to 
proceedings "to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his successors/' Utah 
Code Ann. §75-3-104. The trial court therefore erred by holding section 104 "prohibits a 
claim against a decedent" without the appointment of a personal representative, as such 
holding is contrary to the plain language of the statute. 
The legislature's explicit decision to allow claims to proceed against a decedent, 
and not strictly against the estate, benefits the public in two ways. First, allowing an 
injured party to proceed strictly against the insurance proceeds, and not against the estate 
of a deceased, allows an injured plaintiff to still seek redress for damages done without 
disturbing an aggrieved family. Indeed, even if a plaintiff were to present a claim within 
the one year (or shorter) time periods set forth in section 803, one can easily imagine how 
a plaintiff might find it highly repugnant to proceed against the estate of a family whose 
loved one was killed in that same auto wreck which injured the plaintiff. 
However, should the holding of the trial court be upheld, a Plaintiff would be 
required to disturb the family of the deceased in order to appoint a personal representative 
and seek compensation for damages. This result would at the very least be contrary to the 
spirit of subsection 803(4)(b)'s provisions allowing claims to proceed to the extent of 
liability limits only. 
J4 
Second, allowing an injured party to proceed against a decedent up to the limits of 
liability only even where there is no personal representative prevents a fundamental 
unfairness to the injured victim. In this instance, Plaintiff was in contact with Mr. 
Martino's insurer State Farm shortly after the collision. (R. 53.) Although this first 
contact was after Mr. Martino's death, no notice was given to Plaintiff of this fact. (R. 
53.) Plaintiffs treatment has been complicated, and it remains uncertain whether he will 
require surgery; however Plaintiff has maintained regular contact with State Farm 
throughout. (R. 53, 59.) Although State Farm could have immediately discovered Mr. 
Martino's death by contacting its insured upon receipt of notice of the claim by Plaintiff, 
State Farm itself did not know of Mr. Martino's death until more than four years after the 
date of the collision, and far beyond the three year time period to appoint a personal 
representative. (R. 35.) 
As there was no probate filed, there was no constructive notice of Mr. Martino's 
death for Plaintiff, nor was there any actual notice given until more than four years after 
the collision. Accordingly Plaintiff did not know, nor did he have any reason to know, 
that the young man involved in the collision with him was deceased. And even though 
State Farm also did not know of this unfortunate event, State Farm has nevertheless 
argued Plaintiffs claim should be barred for failure to react to an unknown event. 
There are potentially numerous other instances where, as a practical matter, a 
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plaintiff could not reasonably hope to discover whether a defendant were alive or dead. 
In today's highly mobile society, defendants can readily be expected to leave the State of 
Utah, or the United States. Auto collisions commonly involve defendants who are not 
citizens of the United States, who are non-resident students, or who are traveling 
temporarily on Utah roads, to name only a few examples. Deaths which have occurred 
out of state are highly unlikely to be discovered by a plaintiff; deaths out of the country 
are all but impossible for a plaintiff to discover. Defendants with common names also 
would be virtually impossible to identify as deceased or alive. 
Such a rule requiring a tort victim to discover the death of a defendant would in 
essence dramatically shorten the statute of limitations for any claim against defendants 
which are covered by liability insurance. As even the most cautious litigant is not always 
capable of ascertaining whether a defendant is alive or deceased even after initiating 
litigation, a rule requiring a litigant to appoint a personal representative where a defendant 
is deceased would effectively shorten any three year statute of limitations or greater to far 
less than three years, so a plaintiff would have sufficient time to ascertain the status of the 
defendant and appoint a personal representative within three years. This interpretation 
would not only effect tort claims, but any claim where liability coverage may apply, 
including contractual claims to perform services, construction liability claims, and so on. 
Surely the legislature was aware of the fundamental unfairness which could befall 
16 
an injured party, negotiating in good faith with an insurer, who neither knew nor had 
reason to know of a tortfeasor's death. Section 803 allows claims to proceed against the 
decedent up to the limits of the insurance policy, and not just against a personal 
representative, eliminating this potential unfairness to plaintiffs while simultaneously 
providing the family of the deceased freedom from involvement in the appointment of a 
personal representative and in any subsequent litigation. These sound public policy 
concerns establish a clear reason for the above plain language of section 803 allowing 
claims to continue against the decedent, and not solely against a personal representative. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erred by holding Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 requires appointment 
of a personal representative for claims against a decedent; rather, this requirement only 
exists for claims against the estate of a decedent. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(4)(b) 
explicitly allows claims to proceed against a decedent. The trial court should therefore be 
reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings to establish the liability of the decedent 
consistent with section 803 of the Probate Code. 
DATED this 13 day of May, 2009. 
FLICKING^R & SUTTERFIELD 
4vlark T. Flicl^inger / / * 
Brett R. Boulton / / 
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ADDENDUM 
Third Judical District Court Memorandum Decision, January 16,2009. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM BERNEAU, 
Plaintiff, 
JAN 2 t 21 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
MEMORANDl^$E^£6 DEPARTMENT 
vs. 
CAMERON D. MARTINO, AKA DAVID 
M. CAMERON; AND THE ESTATE OF 
CAMERON D. MARTINO AKA DAVID M. 
CAMERON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 080915531 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, 
January 16, 2009 
JR. 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
•Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. 
The. Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions on 
January 9, 2009. Following the hearing, the matters were taken 
under advisement. 
• The Court having considered the motions and memoranda and 
for the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
Specifically, this matter presents itself the result of an 
automobile accident occurring on September 23, 2003. 
With the motion to dismiss, Defendant asserts the driver who 
would have been the proper defendant, Cameron Martino, died from 
causes unrelated to the accident on December 3, 2003. No probate 
or other proceeding to appoint a personal representative was ever 
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presented. This is critical, argues Defendant, as the Utah 
statutes are explicit about the method to bring an action for 
claimed damages against the estate of a decedent. Indeed, 
asserts Defendant, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 controls claims made 
against a decedent or his successors and provides: 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the 
estate of a decedent or his successors may be 
revived or commenced before the appointment 
of a personal representative. After the 
appointment and until distribution, all 
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim 
against the estate are governed by the 
procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. After 
distribution a creditor whose claim has not 
been barred may recover from the distributees 
as provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a 
former personal representative individually 
liable as provided in Section 75-3-1005. This 
section has no application to a proceeding by 
a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce 
his right to his security except as to any 
deficiency judgment which might be sought 
therein. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104. 
Moreover, contends Defendant, the statute of limitations for 
when such an action may be commenced is found in Utah Code Ann. § 
75-3-107, which provides the following in relevant part: 
(1) No informal probate or appointment 
proceeding or formal testacy or appointment 
proceeding, other than a proceeding to 
probate a will previously probated at the 
testator's domicile and appointment 
proceedings relating to an estate in which 
there has been a prior appointment, may be 
commenced more than three years after the 
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decedent's death. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107. 
In the instant, argues Defendant, no probate or other 
proceeding to appoint a personal representative was ever 
presented. Accordingly, asserts Defendant, the Utah statutes now 
bar any proceeding to appoint a special administrator or personal 
representative as well as any claims against the estate of the 
decedent. Consequently, contends Defendant, the Plaintiff's 
claims fail as a matter of law.1 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing the limitations on 
presentations of claims for creditors under the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code explicitly allows proceedings to establish the 
1Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss arguing Defendant 
first asserted that a claim may not be made unless a personal 
representative has been appointed and in the Reply, Defendant now 
argues that the claim has abated. Because Defendant's reply 
argument is new and not rebuttal, contends Plaintiff, such should 
be stricken. 
Defendant opposes the motion arguing he did not raise new 
issues in his Reply. Indeed, asserts Defendant, his argument has 
always been that (1) Section 75-3-104 prohibits a claim against a 
decedent or his successors until a personal representative can be 
appointed, and (2) Section 75-3-107 prohibits that from occurring 
more than three years after the death. 
While the wording may not be optimal, the Court is not 
persuaded Defendant raised new issues with his Reply Memorandum. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is, respectfully, 
deni ed. 
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liability of a decedent up to the limits of insurance protection 
for this auto collision after one year following the death of 
Defendant. Specifically, asserts Plaintiff, "The running of any 
statute of limitations measured from some other event than death 
and advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspended 
during the three months following the decedent's death but 
resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the 
sections which follow." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-802. In this 
case, contends Plaintiff, his claim is for personal injuries 
arising out of an automobile collision and not the Defendant's 
death. Therefore, argues Plaintiff, his claim is controlled by 
the four year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2-307(3) and suit was timely filed within four years. 
Indeed, asserts Plaintiff, in the sections that follow 
Section 802, the time limits for presenting any and all claims 
are, again, explicitly set forth under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-8 03 
which provides: 
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate 
which arose before the death of the decedent, 
including claims of the state and any 
subdivision of it, whether due or to become 
due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or 
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or 
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by 
other statute of limitations, are barred 
against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of 
the decedent, unless presenred within the 
earlier of the following dates. 
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(a) one year after the decedent's death; 
or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 
75-3-801(2) for creditors who are given 
actual notice, and where notice is published, 
within the time provided in Subsection 
75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by 
publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the 
nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile 
are also barred in this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate 
which arise at or after the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and 
any of its subdivisions, whether due or to 
become due, absolute or contingent, 
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on 
contract, tort, or other legal basis are 
barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of 
the decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the 
personal representative within three months 
after performance by the personal 
representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of 
three months after it arises, or the time 
specified in Subsection (1)(a). 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or 
prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any 
mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property 
of the estate; 
fb) to the limits of the insurance 
protection only, any proceeding Lo establish 
liability of the decedent or the persona] 
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representative for which he is protected by 
liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for 
services rendered and reimbursement for 
expenses advanced by the personal 
representative or by the attorney or 
accountant for the personal representative of 
the estate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 (Emphasis added). 
This action arises from an accident which occurred more than 
five years ago. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 prohibits a claim 
against a decedent or his successors until a personal 
representative can be appointed. In this instant, it is 
undisputed no probate or other proceeding to appoint a personal 
representative has ever been presented. This said, Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-107 prohibits the presentation of such an action from 
occurring more than three years after the decedent's death. 
While Plaintiff seems to imply that he is bringing this 
action against the insurer (who is not a party) such an effort is 
contrary to Utah law in the absence of a contractual provision, 
statute or ordinance to the contrary. 
Finally, while Plaintiff has argued § 75-3-803 should apply 
as such sets forth the statute of limitations as to creditors, 
which he claims he is, it is important to note that in the 
Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-3-107 the following is 
stated: 
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All creditors' claims are barred after three 
years from death. See § 75-3-803 (1) (b) [which 
now prescribes shorter periods after notice 
to creditors]. Because of this, and since any 
possibility that letters may be issued at any 
time would be seen as a "cloud" on the title 
of heirs or devisees otherwise secure under § 
75-3-101, the three-year statute of 
limitations applies to bar appointment of a 
personal representative after the basic 
period has passed. Section 83 of the Model 
Probate Code barred probate and 
administration after five years, and other 
statutes imposing time limits on these 
proceedings are cited at pp. 307-310 of Model 
Probate Code. A qualification covers the 
situation where a closed administration is 
sought to be reopened to administer 
after-discovered assets. See § 75-3-1008. If 
there has been no probate or appointment 
within three years, and if either exception 
to § 75-3-102 applies, devisees under a 
late-discovered will may use a will to 
establish their title. But, they may not 
secure probate of the will, nor may they 
obtain appointment of a personal 
representative. The same pattern applies to 
heirs who, in a case where there has been no 
administration discover assets after the 
three-year period has run. Such persons will 
not be able to protect purchasers with the 
ease of those interested in an estate where a 
personal representative has been appointed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107 (Emphasis added). 
In sum, after reviewing the record in this matter, as well 
as the relevant statutory and case law, the Court finds 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is well taken and grants the same. 
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